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Abstract—  A lack of awareness surrounding secure online 
behaviour can lead to end-users, and their personal details 
becoming vulnerable to compromise.  This paper describes an 
ongoing research project in the field of usable security, 
examining the relationship between end-user-security behaviour, 
and the use of affective feedback to educate end-users.   Part of 
the aforementioned research project considers the link between 
categorical information users reveal about themselves online, and 
the information users believe, or report that they have revealed 
online. The experimental results confirm a disparity between 
information revealed, and what users think they have revealed, 
highlighting a deficit in security awareness.  Results gained in 
relation to the affective feedback delivered are mixed, indicating 
limited short-term impact.  Future work seeks to perform a long-
term study, with the view that positive behavioural changes may 
be reflected in the results as end-users become more 
knowledgeable about security awareness. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Risky security behaviour displayed by end-users has the 
potential to leave devices vulnerable to compromise [1].  
Despite the availability of security tools such as firewalls and 
virus scanners, designed to aid users in defending themselves 
against online threats, these tools cannot stop users engaging in 
risky behaviour in the context of a browser-based environment. 
This indicates a need to assess the current behaviour of end-
users, and to educate them regarding the security implications 
of their actions online.  Previous research into educational tools 
suggest the use of affective feedback as a possible method to 
utilise in a browser-based environment. 
As part of a research project, a prototype Firefox extension 
named Spengler-Zuul was developed, monitoring user actions, 
and employing the use of affective feedback as a potential 
method of user education.  This paper outlines part of a 
research project whereby a series of experiments have been 
conducted to gauge how behaviour logged by the 
aforementioned tool (categorical information) compares to 
behaviour reported in follow-up questionnaires with the users.  
Providing a comparison highlights levels of security awareness 
in end-users, and aids in demonstrating the potential role 
affective feedback can have in security education. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section will outline risky security behaviours users 
may encounter when browsing the web.  It discusses studies 
covering methods of measuring risk perception.  Owing to the 
reliance on the internet, several pieces of research have posited 
the need to educate end-users regarding security behaviour, 
highlighting areas in which they may be vulnerable online.  A 
number of existing tools are reviewed, prior to a discussion of 
the role of affective feedback in an educational environment.  
A novel approach utilising a combined affective feedback and 
monitoring solution is described, before the disparity between 
categorical user behaviour versus reported user behaviour is 
explored. 
A. Risky security behaviour 
What constitutes risky behaviour is not necessarily obvious 
to all end-users and therefore, it can be difficult to recognise. 
Examples of such behaviour can include: interacting with a 
website containing coding vulnerabilities [2], downloading 
data from unsafe websites [3] or, creating weak 
passwords/sharing passwords with colleagues [4][5]. 
A number of studies have been conducted, in an attempt to 
define and categorise risky security behaviour. In 2012, a 
taxonomy was developed by Padayachee [6] to categorise 
compliant security behaviours whilst investigating if particular 
users had a predisposition to adhering to security behaviour. 
The results of the research highlighted elements which may 
influence security behaviours in users e.g. extrinsic motivation, 
identification, awareness and organisational commitment. 
Another study was documented in a 2005 paper by Stanton 
et al [4]. Interviews were conducted with IT and security 
experts, in addition to a study involving end-users in the US, 
across a range of professions. The findings produced a 
taxonomy consisting of 6 identified risky behaviours: 
intentional destruction, detrimental misuse, dangerous 
tinkering, naïve mistakes, aware assurance and basic hygiene. 
Milne et. al. [9] investigated risky behaviours in relation to 
self-efficacy. During the survey, participants were asked if they 
had engaged in specific risky behaviours online. These 
suggestions were drawn from previous research into risky 
behaviours [10-11].  The paper concludes that depending on 
the demographic and the self-efficacy of the end-user, different 
types of behaviour are exhibited online.  
Behaviours users were asked about in the survey included 
the use of private email addresses to register for contests on 
websites, selecting passwords consisting of dictionary words, 
and accepting unknown friends on social networking sites. The 
most common risky behaviour which participants admitted to 
was allowing the computer to save passwords: 56% of 
participants admitted to this. 
A lack of perception regarding online security risks can 
leave users, and their devices vulnerable to compromise. 
B. Measuring perception of risk 
Over the years, a variety of techniques have been utilised in 
an attempt to measure the perception of risk which the end-user 
possesses.  Hill and Donaldson proposed a methodology to 
integrate models of behaviour and perception [10].The research 
attempted to assess the perception of security the system 
administrator possesses, and create a trust model which reduces 
the threat from malicious software. The methodology engaged 
system administrators whilst developing the threat modelling 
process, and quantified risk of threats, essentially creating a 
triage system to deal with issues. 
In a different scenario, Ur et. al. [11] investigated the 
correlation between users’ perceptions of password strengths 
and their actual strength on smartphones. The research 
employed the use of an online study to measure users thought 
on password strength and memorability, and their 
understanding of potential attacks. This data was compared 
against to users’ perceptions regarding how passwords would 
fare against password cracking attacks. Comparing the data, 
allowed for the perception of risky behaviours to be 
determined. 
Ng, Kankanhalli and Xu [12] devised a health belief 
analogy when explaining the perception of risk in terms of 
cyber security. Experiments were conducted with an example 
based upon email attachments. It was concluded that users’ 
security behaviour could be determined via perceived 
susceptibility, perceived benefits, and self-efficacy. 
San-José and Rodriguez [13] used a multimodal approach 
to measure perception of risk.  In a study of over 3000 
households with PCs connected to the internet, users were 
given an antivirus program to install which scanned the 
machines on a monthly basis. The software was supplemented 
by quarterly questionnaires, allowing levels of perception to be 
measured and compared with virus scan results. Users were 
successfully monitored and results showed that the antivirus 
software created a false sense of security and that users were 
unaware of how serious certain risks could be. 
C. Education and awareness of  risky security behaviours 
A variety of tools have been developed to address differing 
aspects of risky security behaviours, and these are outlined in 
this section. 
One such example is the password strength meters used in 
research by Ur et. al [14].  These meters were placed next to 
password fields and improved the security and usability of 
passwords.  The tool was deemed to be a useful aid in 
password creation with participants noting that use of words 
such as “weak” encouraged them into creating a stronger 
password.  However, there were potential issues with retention, 
and 38% of participants admitted to writing down their 
password from the previous day. 
Other research has explored educating users regarding 
phishing attempts.  Such tools have included Anti-Phishing 
Phil by Sheng et. al [15] which attempt to gamify the subject. 
After playing the game, 41% of participants viewed the URL 
of the web page, checking if it was genuine. The game 
produced some unwanted results in that participants became 
overly cautious, producing a number of false-positives during 
the experimental phase.  PhishGuru is another training tool 
designed by Kumaraguru et. al [16] to discourage people from 
revealing information in phishing attacks. When a user clicks 
on a link in a suspicious email, they are presented with a 
cartoon message, warning them of the dangers of phishing. In a 
short-term study, the cartoon proved to be effective: 
participants retained the information after 28 days. 
A newer tool, NoPhish has been developed to educate users 
about phishing on mobile devices [17]. The game features 
multiple levels where users are presented with a URL and are 
asked if is a legitimate link or a phishing attempt. Participants 
gave significantly more correct answers when asked about 
phishing after playing the game.  In a longer-term study results 
showed participants still performed well however, their overall 
performance decreased. 
Information that allows phishing emails to be targeted 
towards specific users can come from revealing too much 
information online. A proposed series of nutrition labels for 
online privacy have been designed in an effort to reduce risky 
behaviour [18].  The nutrition labels seek to present the 
information in an easily readable format, aiding users to 
understand privacy policies online.  Results from a small study 
found that visually, the labels were more interesting to read 
than a traditional security policy and presented an easier way 
for users to find information. 
A Firefox extension developed by Maurer [19] attempts to 
provide alert dialogs when users are entering sensitive data 
such as credit card information. The extension seeks to raise 
security awareness, providing large JavaScript dialogs to warn 
users, noting that the use of certain colours made the user feel 
more secure. 
More recently, Volkamer et. al. developed a Firefox Add-
On, called PassSec in attempt to help users detect websites 
which provided insecure environments for entering a password 
[20]. The extension successfully raised security awareness and 
significantly reduced the number of insecure logins. 
The tools discussed in this section span a number of years, 
and some of the research may seem outdated.  However, the 
range, and age of the research tools developed indicates there is 
still a problem with effectively educating users regarding 
security awareness.  This suggests a different approach is 
required for user education: the use of affective feedback is a 
potential approach. 
D. Affective feedback and risky behaviours 
Affective feedback is defined as “the process of using 
technology to help people achieve and maintain specific 
internal states” [21] i.e. using signals to alter user behaviour. 
Previous research has indicated affective feedback may serve 
as a successful method of educating users about risky security 
behaviours [21][22][23]. User’s attitudes regarding risky 
security behaviour must be modified in a bid to keep them 
safer online. Thus, by influencing end-users via affective 
feedback it may be possible to positively impact upon the 
security awareness of the end-user. 
Virtual human characters, avatars, and textual content [24] 
and the use of colour and sound [21] have been used to 
influence state.  Avatars provide affective feedback and have 
been seen to be beneficial in educational environments 
[21][22][23]. Textual information with the use of specific 
words also has the potential to alter a user's state/behaviour e.g. 
a password may be described as “weak” and this can encourage 
them to create a stronger password [14]. Colour is also often 
utilised, with green or blue used to imply a positive occurrence, 
with red indicating a negative outcome [14]. 
To further the argument for use of affective feedback 
Wixon [25] discusses its benefits but also calls for more studies 
into the role of affective computing, placing emphasis on the 
need for empirical data. This is an argument also put forward 
by Beale and Creed [26] in their overview of emotional 
simulations.  Affective feedback has the potential to be utilised 
in the field of security education, thus the application of such a 
mechanism in this research project. 
Research conducted in the following section seeks to utilise 
an affective approach, deploying the use of a monitoring 
solution with an integrated affective feedback delivery system, 
in an attempt to improve end-user security awareness. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Prototypes developed 
A XUL-based Firefox extension was developed for the 
research project, named Spengler-Zuul.  This incorporated a 
monitoring solution capable of detecting potential security risks 
such as if a page contains malicious links, or a password 
entered it too short.  These risky behaviours were drawn from 
previous research [7][8][9] and were chosen as they could 
apply to the context of a browser-based environment.  When 
the user interacts with the browser, the information is 
encrypted, and processed on the server.  As an example, 
processing the information on a server allows the URL of a 
current site to be compared against a known database of 
malicious sites [27].  Detection of a malicious site can then 
trigger the affective feedback mechanism, delivering some 
form of information to the end-user.  A unique log file is 
generated for each browser session, and records risky security 
behaviour triggers e.g. if a user visited a malicious site. 
3 methods of affective feedback were chosen: colours, 
avatars and text. Previous research has indicated there are a 
number of types of affective feedback which could be utilised 
within the web browser window, to help guide users into 
making more appropriate security decisions.  Depending on the 
actions of the user, they may be offered positive reinforcement 
because of their behaviour, negative reinforcement, or a 
mixture of both positive and negative. 
The sentences contained in the Spengler-Zuul extension 
came from text in an affective word list named AFINN [28].  
The avatars were chosen in relation to Ekman’s 6 basic 
emotions [29].  Specifically, the happy and sad avatars used in 
this research project were drawn from work conducted by the 
Swiss Center for Affective Sciences [30].  Finally, colours used 
were chosen due to their usage in previous research projects 
[14][21].  The final colours chosen were: red (#CF4250), 
yellow (#EBA560), and green (#78BF60), producing a traffic-
light system. 
Multiple versions of the Spengler-Zuul extension were 
developed, allowing differing combinations of affective 
feedback to be tested against a control environment: 
• Spengler-Zuul (none)- monitors users, no on-
screen feedback. 
• Spengler-Zuul (text)- monitors users, displays 
text-based affective feedback. 
• Spengler-Zuul (text, avatar)- monitors users and 
displays text-based affective feedback, and an 
avatar 
• Spengler-Zuul (text, colour)- monitors users and 
displays text-based affective feedback, and colour 
• Spengler-Zuul (text, colour, avatar)- monitors 
users and displays text-based affective feedback, 
and colour. Additionally, an avatar is situated in 
the bottom right of the screen (Fig 1). 
 
 
Fig 1. Screenshot of the Spengler-Zuul (text and colour and avatar) extension 
 
B. Experimental phase 
During the experimental process, participants were initially 
given an “Information For Participants” handout, noting that 
the experiment was testing a Firefox extension.  Security 
awareness and behaviour were not mentioned, in relation to the 
experiments, in an effort to eliminate bias.  Participants were 
then given a random USB stick, labelled with a number from 1-
5 and each USB stick contained a portable version of the 
Firefox browser, with a version of the monitoring 
solution/affective feedback mechanism add-on pre-installed 
(Table 1). After signing the consent form, participants were 
asked to work their way through an instruction sheet, visiting 
specific websites.  
Table 1. Different versions of feedback included in each experiment. 
USB Group Feedback type Participants 
(n) 
1 Control 12 
2 Text 13 
3 Text, avatar 16 
4 Text, colour 14 
5 Text, colour, avatar 17 
 
Participants were asked to visit a number of predefined 
sites, some with false positives to trigger appropriate feedback 
on-screen e.g. fake malicious links to trigger warnings. During 
the experimental process, participants were also asked to 
complete a web form, asking them personal information such 
as hobbies.  Completing this form was entirely optional 
however, revealing such information could have been deemed 
a risky security behaviour.   
On completion of the computer-based part of the 
experiment, participants were asked to complete a paper-based 
questionnaire regarding how well they thought they responded 
to any feedback shown on-screen. In the background, the users’ 
actions on the computer-based part of the experiment were 
logged, meaning the information provided in the questionnaire 
can be corroborated against the information in the unique log 
files. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
The log files gained from the monitoring solution were 
compared with data from the questionnaire participants 
answered.  By comparing these approaches, an understanding 
of user awareness of risky security behaviour can be developed 
i.e. do the log files reflect what users said they actually did in 
the questionnaires?  This multi-modal approach is comparable 
with work by San-José and Rodriguez [13], whereby they 
compared virus scan log data against questionnaire data. 
The main difference Table 2  highlights is that when asked 
if they used a common password, participants largely said 
“no”. However, there is a significant statistical difference when 
the log files are viewed, indicating that many users did in fact 
have common elements in their passwords. The same 
difference is seen across all experiments containing affective 
feedback, suggesting it did not have an impact on the actions of 
users in this instance. 
In terms of revealing personal information, there was a 
significantly higher number of participants who revealed 
personal information about themselves (categorical 
information) in the log files vs. those who reported they 
revealed personal information in the questionnaire in 
experiments groups 1 (control) and 3 (text and avatar-based 
feedback). This potentially highlights a lack of security 
awareness in end users who haven’t realised the level of 
information they divulged. This could also explain the similar 
results for “Did user enter email address?” in groups 4 (text, 
colour-based feedback) and 5 (text, colour, avatar-based 
feedback), and “Did user visit a malicious site?” in groups 1 
(control) and 2 (text-based feedback). 
Table 2. Experimental results- log files vs. questionnaire data 
 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
When the questionnaire results (report information) were 
compared to the log files (categorical information) there was 
one key question regarding risky security behaviour which 
produced a statistically significant result. 
During the experimental process, when participants were 
asked if they had used a dictionary password, the majority of 
those asked stated “no”. However, after analysing the requisite 
log files, there was a noted statistical significance which 
indicated that the majority of the participants had a common 
element in their password. The same statistical difference is 
noted across all of the experiments which delivered varying 
combinations of affective feedback. 
Since similar results are seen across all experiments 
containing affective feedback, it suggests the delivery of the 
affective feedback did not have an overall impact on the 
actions of the participants in this instance, however, there is 
another potential explanation for such a result. 
This result highlights there is still a need to raise security 
awareness in end-users and educate people regarding security 
behaviours which are perceived to be risky [31]. One 
interpretation of the result is that participants may not have 
been aware of the term “dictionary word” in relation to 
password. Additionally, they may not have been aware that 
Question Group 1 
(Control) 
Group 
2 
(Text) 
Group 3 
(Text, 
avatar) 
Group 4 
(Text, 
colour) 
Group 5 
(Text, 
colour, 
avatar) 
User revealed 
personal 
information 
Yes No Yes No No 
User entered 
private email 
address 
No No No Yes Yes 
Entered a 
common 
password 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
User had 
personal 
details in 
password 
No No No No No 
User visited a 
malicious site Yes Yes No No No 
dictionary words in passwords contribute to poor password 
hygiene [7]. 
When participants were asked if they had revealed personal 
information about themselves during the course of the 
experiments, there was a significant difference between those 
who reported revealing information about themselves (as per 
the questionnaire data), in comparison to the number of 
participants who categorically revealed personal information 
about themselves, as revealed by the appropriate log files. 
In experiment 1 (control) and experiment 3 (text and 
avatar-based feedback) there was a significantly higher 
proportion of participants who categorically revealed personal 
information about themselves in the log files, in comparison to 
those who reported they revealed information about themselves 
when answering the questionnaire. Again, this result could be 
explained by the fact participants had a poor understanding of 
risky security behaviour, and perhaps did not understand the 
consequences which could arise from sharing such information. 
A poor understanding of risky security behaviours could 
also explain the similarly statistically significant results gained 
when participants were asked if they entered a private email 
address during the course of the study. Whilst the concept of a 
private email address is purely subjective (what constitutes a 
private email address may differ depending on the user and 
purpose of the address), the log files were simple parsed in an 
effort to determine if the user had provided some form of 
information in the private email address field. Experiment 4 
(text and colour-based feedback) and experiment 5 (text, colour 
and avatar-based feedback) produced statistically significant 
results, with more users revealing email addresses in the log 
files. 
When asking users if they had visited a malicious website 
during the course of the experiment, a statistically significant 
result was gained in experiment 1 (control) and experiment 2 
(text-based feedback). Essentially, more users categorically 
visited malicious sites (according to the log files) than reported 
visiting malicious sites in the questionnaire. Since experiment 1 
does not contain any form of affective feedback whereas 
experiment 2 does, therefore such a result could again be 
attributed to the participant’s lack of security awareness when 
browsing sites online. The proportion of those visiting 
malicious sites in experiment 1 also highlights the requirement 
for a tool to help users- if users are not provided with any 
feedback (like in experiment 1), they will have no way of 
knowing a link they are clicking on is malicious. 
All information provided during the experimental process 
was voluntary, and this statement was clearly displayed at the 
top of the web pages which asked for information such as 
mother’s maiden name, hobbies, email address, etc., which 
again highlights participants either chose to divulge sensitive 
information, or that they actively engaged in risky security 
behaviour by failing to read the page properly. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Affective feedback did not appear to have an impact on the 
behaviour of users as recorded by categorical information in 
the log files. The majority of results gained were insignificant. 
One anomaly was generated by experiment 5 (text, colour and 
avatar-based feedback) when participants were asked about the 
information they revealed about themselves, in comparison to 
the control log file. This produced a positive result, where 
fewer participants in experiment 5 divulged information and 
this suggests affective feedback may have made a difference.  
However, given that all other results were insignificant, it is 
more plausible that the particular group of participants already 
possessed a good knowledge of risky security behaviours. 
Overall, it has been concluded affective feedback did not have 
an impact on participant behaviour, as per the log files. 
However, the results gained still highlight an interesting 
point.  In comparing categorical behaviour (log files) and 
reported behaviour (questionnaires), participants were found to 
have engaged in instances of risky security behaviours which 
they were unaware of, and this indicates a generally low level 
of awareness of risky security behaviour. 
This research project involved a small-scale experiment.  
Potentially, if affective feedback was delivered over a longer 
period of time, on a daily basis, the log files could potentially 
reflect positive behavioural changes as end-users become more 
knowledgeable regarding the subject matter.  Future work 
seeks to explore the long-term application of affective feedback 
in the domain of security awareness. 
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